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Abstract: - This article deals with detection of threats in IP telephony, the authors developed a penetration testing 
system that is able to check up the level of protection from security threats in IP telephony. SIP is being widely used in 
building VoIP networks. Unlike the traditional telephone networks VoIP networks does not have a closed 
communication which makes communication medium vulnerable to all kinds of attacks from the in truders. The SIP 
server is a key component of  VoIP infrastructure and often becomes the aim of attacks and providers have to ensure 
the appropriate level of security. We have developed web-based penetration system which is able to check the SIP 
server if can face to the most common attacks. The developed application is distributed as an open-source and is 
equipped with four modules. The result is reported to the particular e-mail and information supplemented to the report 
should help to improve the overall protection of the SIP server. The developed application represents effective tool 
which is able to point out the weaknesses of the tested system. 
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1   Introduction 
System designed to test and monitor networks or other 
components are quite wide-spread these days. Examples 
of the principle ones are Nessus, Retina, Snort and other. 
The majority of these systems allows for testing the 
whole network infrastructures and protocols used for 
communication between components. None of these 
solutions, however, enables a complex testing of VoIP 
infrastructure and SIP servers which are the key and 
most vulnerable component of the network. The system 
we developed, under a working title SPT (SIP 
Penetration Testing), was designed as a penetration tests 
simulator for SIP servers. Based on the analysis of 
intersections, the person who initiated the testing (“the 
tester”) receives feedback in the form of test results, as 
well as recommendations how to mitigate potential 
security risks that were discovered. The advantage of 
this solution is that the system simulates real attacks 
from the external network, i.e. the system does not need 
to be placed in the same network as the target 
component DUT (Device under Test). This is frequently 
one of prerequisites to be able to use other testing tools. 
The SPT system was implemented as a web application 
accessible through a standard web browser and therefore 
independent on the operation system’s platform. As the 
solution was developed as a part of the research intent of 
the CESNET association, this system will also be 
incorporated into its network and will be accessible after 
signing in using the SSO (Single Sign-On) service - 
Shibboleth. This should also prevent the system being 
used for other than testing purposes. Once signed in, the 
tester enters the required data into a web form and 
chooses tests to be run. The output of the application 
once the tests have been completed is an e-mail report to 
the tester. This paper contains the results of the tests; and 
in case some penetrations were successful it also 
contains recommendations and measures to mitigate 
such attacks in the future. Fig. 1 illustrates the concept of 
the SPT system. The following chapter describes 
individual testing methods in detail, their 
implementation, algorithms used and the impact on the 
target SIP server. 
 
Fig. 1. SIP Penetration Tests System Scheme. 
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2   Methods 
Although the system is primarily designed for 
penetration tests on SIP servers, in reality it can perform 
full-scale attacks on a particular component and provide 
feedback on it to the tester. Thus, it is necessary to 
ensure that the developed system cannot be abused by a 
third party. The system was designed as a LAMP (Linux, 
Apache, MySQL, PHP) server and its complete 
administration including the installation is carried out via 
a web interface. For reasons stated above, the system 
will be incorporated into the CESNET’s network and 
will only be accessible to authorized persons once they 
pass through the authentication. Once the tester fills in 
the IP address or domain name of the central SIP server 
and the email address to which the test results will be 
sent to. Using checkboxes, the tester may define the 
range of the modules offered for testing. Individual 
modules are described below in detail. 
 
2.1  Scanning and Monitoring Module 
In order to be able to carry out an efficient and precise 
attack on a SIP server, the potential attacker needs to 
find out the most information about a particular 
component [1], [2]. This is why we first developed a 
Scanning and Monitoring (“S&M”) module for the SPT 
system, which is used to test the security of the central 
against attacks aimed at obtaining information by means 
of common and available tools (Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. SPT System – S&M Module. 
 
These tools include for instance Nmap or ever more 
popular SIPVicious. SPT system also uses these testing 
tools. By means of these tools, it is possible to obtain a 
list of listening ports or a list of user accounts created on 
the central concerned from an unsecured server [3]. 
Where the server is not secured sufficiently, they can 
obtain even the most important, that is passwords to 
individual accounts. If the tester ticks the test to be 
carried out, the Nmap application is used first to 
establish open ports. Given the time requirements of the   
[s] test, the testing is by default restricted only to several 
most frequently used ports. Using the web form, the 
tester can set the range of the tested ports. However the 
total time set for testing using Nmap is 1800s (30 
minutes). The list of available ports is subsequently 
included in the assessment report together with 
recommendations how to minimise such ports’ scanning. 
Another test which the SPT system can carry out aims at 
establishing whether SIP server’s security allows for 
obtaining a list of user accounts. For this purpose, 
SIPVicious is used. By sending out OPTION and ACK 
requests, the application detects what accounts are 
defined on the SIP server. By default, the system tries 
the 100-999 range of accounts.  
Again, the tester may define own range of tested 
numbers nrE  or import a text file containing strings of 
alpha-numeric characters or words drE  . Time required 
to check and create a list of eT   [s] accounts can be 
expressed by equation (1) where  0.02603 is a time 
constant obtained by repetitive measurements on a 
sample of 1000 potential accounts on different target SIP 
servers. 
 
cEET drnre ⋅+= )(     (1) 
 
Number of valid accounts validE  is derived from 
equation (2) where invalidE  is the number of accounts 
that have been reviewed by the system but not defined 
on the SIP server. 
 
invaliddrnrvalid EEEE −+= )(    (2) 
 
Once the system has tested security of the SIP server 
against detecting accounts, possibility to detect 
passwords for individual accounts is tested. Again, this 
testing is carried out by SIPVicious. Using a pre-defined 
range of possible numeric passwords nrP or an imported 
text file with alpha-numeric characters or words drP  , it 
obtains a list of passwords for individual accounts. Time 
requirements on this test are expressed by the following 
equation (3). 
 
[ ] cPPET drnrvalidp ⋅+⋅= )(    (3) 
 
npesm TTTT ++=     (4) 
 
Now we can determine the estimated time required to 
carry out the complete S&M test  smT  (4). Using the 
module, we can verify whether the target SIP server is 
sufficiently secured against such scanning and 
monitoring attacks [9]. 
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The followin Fig.  3.  shows  a structure of PHP code 
which enables to perform the above described tests. First 
of all, the incompleted subtests corresponding to only 
S&M module (type 2) are selected from database. 
Variable $RRow provides  serialized information which 
were carried back from database. These information 
contain what is enabled and disabled in prepared tests 
and information about target (Device under test), it 
represents IP address or domain name of the tested SIP 
server. Variable $Data contains the deserialized 
information field. 
 
$Result = mysql_query("SELECT id,rid 
FROM t_test WHERE type='2' AND 
value='0'"); 
for($i=0;$i<mysql_num_rows($Result);$i
++) 
 { 
  $Row = mysql_fetch_row($Result); 
  
$FResult = mysql_query(" SELECT id,rid
, value FROM t_test WHERE 
rid='".$Row[1]."' AND type='1'"); 
  $FRow = mysql_fetch_row($FResult); 
  if($FRow[2] == -1 || $FRow[2] == 1) 
   { 
    $RResult = mysql_query("SELECT 
data FROM t_raw WHERE 
id='".$Row[1]."'"); 
    $RRow = mysql_fetch_row($RResult); 
    $Data = unserialize($RRow[0]); 
    $MData = $Data['Sam']; 
    mysql_query("UPDATE t_test SET  
start=NOW(),value=10 WHERE id='".$Row[
0]."'"); 
    $Res = ""; 
 
Fig. 3. Výběr informací s databáze pro S&M testy. 
 
As we have already stated in texts above, S&M tests are 
performed by two open-source application – Nmap and 
SIPVicious. This situation is depicted on Fig. 4, this 
figure represents the way of realization  the tests based 
on two tools mentioned above. The commnad shell_exec 
calls particular string for nmap, in dependence on fact if 
the testing of default ports was selected or own range 
was submitted. The final result is stored into variable 
$Res. If the detection of SIP aacounts and passwords is 
allowed then the application SIPVicious is launched. For 
this case, a script svmap.py in Phyton was prepared. The 
script is able to recognize which distribution and service 
is applied on SIP server. The result from script is then 
processed by command preg_split that is used for 
parsing and final values are stored in variables 
$SvMapRes and $SvMapResL. System continues with 
testing on SIP server and for this purpose a script 
svwar.py is applied. The retrieved valid accounts are 
checked with next script swcrack.py which tries to find 
out the passwords for individual accounts, the brute-
force attackt was adopted and it takes the time expressed 
in relations (1) – (4).  
 
if($MData['PortEnable']==true) 
   { 
    if($MData['PortDefault']) 
     { 
$Res .= shell_exec("nmap ".$Data['Main
']['Ip']." –PN -sS -sU -
p 20,21,22,23,53,80,443,5060  -A --
host_timeout 30m"); 
     } 
    else 
     { 
$Res .= shell_exec("nmap ".$Data['Main
']['Ip']." -PN -sS -sU -p 
".$MData['PortRange']." -A  --
host_timeout 30m"); 
     } 
   } 
    $Res = str_replace("'","''",$Res); 
  if($MData['ExtensionEnable']==true) 
   { 
$SvMapRes = shell_exec("/server/sipvic
ious/svmap.py ".$Data['Main']['Ip']); 
$SvMapResL = 
preg_split("|\n|",$SvMapRes); 
$SvMapResD = 
preg_split("/\|/",$SvMapResL[2]); 
$SvMapDevice = trim($SvMapResD[1]); 
$SvMapAgent = trim($SvMapResD[2]); 
$SvMapFinger = trim($SvMapResD[3]); 
 
if($MData['ExtensionDefault'] == true) 
 { 
$SvWarRes = shell_exec("/server/sipvic
ious/svwar.py -e100-999 
".$Data['Main']['Ip']); 
 } 
else 
 { 
$SvWarRes = shell_exec("/server/sipvic
ious/svwar.py -
e".$MData['ExtensionRange']."  
".$Data['Main']['Ip']); 
 } 
  
$SvWarResL = 
preg_split("|\n|",$SvWarRes); 
 
for($w=2;$w<sizeof($SvWarResL);$w++) 
 { 
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$SvWarResD[$w] = preg_split("/\|/",$Sv
WarResL[$w]); 
if(strlen(trim($SvWarResD[$w][1]))>0) 
$SvExtensions[trim($SvWarResD[$w][1])]
 = trim($SvWarResD[$w][2]); 
 } 
 
if($MData['PaswDefault'] == true) 
 { 
$SvCrackRes = shell_exec("/server/sipv
icious/svcrack.py -u".." -r100-
999 ".$Data ['Main'] 
['Ip']); 
 } 
 
Fig. 4. Volání aplikací Nmap a SIPVicious. 
 
 
2.2  Denial of Service Module 
One of the most frequently occurring attacks is DoS 
(Denial of Service). In reality, it consists of several 
attacks with the same characteristic feature – to lock up 
or restrict the availability of the attacked service so that 
it does not function properly. Several types of DoSs can 
be used to achieve this; our system tests the SIP server 
using the most frequently used one, Flood DoS. The 
principle of the attack is to send a large volume of 
adjusted or otherwise deformed packets to the target 
component so that it is unable to provide its core 
services [5]-[8]. As a result of the attack, CPU load 
increases and most of the available bandwidth is 
consumed, resulting in the SIP server being unable to 
service regular calls, or only a minimum amount of 
them. To generate Flood DoS, the SPT system uses two 
applications: udpflood and inviteflood [12]. When using 
udpflood, the system generates UDP packets of 1400 
bytes which are directed at SIP default port 5060 of the 
target SIP server. The tester defines the number of 
generated packets and the system tests whether the 
packets arrived at the SIP server and whether they cause 
some restriction of the service availability, see Fig. 5. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. SPT System - DoS Module 
 
Moreover, we had to solve an issue of remote detection 
to determine of the test on SIP server was successful or 
not. The DoS attacks affect the overall SIP server 
performance and impairment of computing time can be 
detected but how to remotely recognize and determine 
that CPU load was increased? Following example of 
PHP script, depicted on Fig. 6, represents a solution 
utilizing ICMP message ping. At first, arithmetic 
average is calculated  and then DoS test si launched. The 
tool udpflood is running and ping response are evaluated 
by the PHP script, the results are continuously compared 
with previous results and if the computed value is 150 
times higher then previous then we consider DoS to be 
successful. If the ping is not allowed on tested SIP server 
then we are not able recognize if  udpflood attack was 
successful or not.  
 
$Res = "dos ok."; 
  
if($MData['Enable'] == true && $MData[
'UdpEnable'] == true) 
   { 
    $ping = new Net_Ping; 
    $fmin = 9999; 
    $fmax = 0; 
    $favg = 0; 
    $favgc = 0; 
    $pingd = 0; 
    for($f=0;$f<20;$f++) 
     { 
      $ping-
>ping($Data['Main']['Ip'],1,6); 
      if ($ping->time) 
       { 
        if($fmin>$ping-
>time) $fmin=$ping->time; 
        if($fmax<$ping-
>time) $fmax=$ping->time; 
        $favg+=$ping->time; 
        $favgc++; 
       } 
      else 
       { 
        $pingd++; 
       } 
     } 
    if($favgc>0) 
     { 
      $favg = $favg/$favgc; 
     } 
 
system("nohup /server/udpflood/udpfloo
d 195.113.113.137 ".$Data['Main']['Ip'
]." 5060 5060 ".$MData['UdpPackets']." 
> /dev/null &"); 
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usleep(10000); 
 
    $f2min = 9999; 
    $f2max = 0; 
    $f2avg = 0; 
    $f2avgc = 0; 
    $p2ingd = 0; 
    for($f=0;$f<20;$f++) 
     { 
      $ping-
>ping($Data['Main']['Ip'],1,6); 
      if ($ping->time) 
       { 
        if($f2min>$ping-
>time) $f2min=$ping->time; 
        if($f2max<$ping-
>time) $f2max=$ping->time; 
        $f2avg+=$ping->time; 
        $f2avgc++; 
        } 
      else 
       { 
        $p2ingd++; 
       } 
     } 
    if($f2avgc>0) 
     { 
      $f2avg = $f2avg/$f2avgc; 
     } 
 
if($pingd>0 || $p2ingd>0) 
 { 
  $DoSUDPOk = false; 
 } 
else 
 { 
  if(($favg*150)<$f2avg) 
   { 
    $DoSUDPOk = true; 
   } 
  else 
   { 
    $DoSUDPOk = false; 
   } 
 } 
   
Fig. 6.  Detection and udpflood start-up . 
 
Since we know the packet’s size and therefore also the 
size of the Ethernet framework udpFs , we can, based on 
the number of generated packets nP   and the bandwidth 
provided wB  , determine time udpT   [s] required to carry 
out the test (5). 
 
( ) /udp udp n wT Fs P B= ⋅     (5)   
 
Table 1. Overview of time required for different 
numbers of generated packets nP   and different 
bandwidth wB  .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the other application, inviteflood, is used for 
testing, the system generates INVITE requests at the SIP 
server which are directed at an existing account. This 
method is very successful as most of today’s SIP servers 
require an authentication for INVITE requests. As the 
INVITE requests generated by our system do not contain 
any authentication string, the SIP server returns SIP 
answer 407 Proxy Authentication Required. With the 
large volume of incoming requests, the load of SIP 
server’s CPU increases. The tester can set the value of a 
valid account in the system manually, or it can be 
randomly selected from the previously obtained list of 
valid accounts validE  . As in the previous case, we can, 
based on the number of generated packets  nP  and the 
bandwidth provided wB , determine time  inviteT  [s] 
required to carry out the test (6). 
 
( ) /invite invite n wT Fs P B= ⋅    (6) 
 
Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of the change in bandwidth 
on CPU load when simulating an udpflood attack. The 
chart also clearly shows resistance of the two popular 
open-source SIP servers, Asterisk PBX and OpenSIPS, 
to UDP Flood DoS attacks. Both centrals have been 
installed on the same HW of Dell PowerEdge R510 
server to eliminate any potential difference in 
computational performance. To change bandwidths, we 
used HW emulator of the Simena networks. CPU load 
on individual centrals was measured by means of dstat 
[10]. The chart shows that OpenSIPS is many times 
more resistant to UDP DoS attacks than Asterisk. Total 
TABLE I 
UDPFLOOD ATTACK TIME DURATION WITH DIFFERENT 
BANDWIDTH AND NUMBER OF GENERATED PACKETS 
Number of Packets - 
P n  
Bandwidth [Mbps] and the Attack 
Time udpT [s] 
10 25 50 100 
100 000 113,12 45,25 22,63 11,31 
200 000 226,24 90,50 45,26 22,62 
300 000 339,36 135,75 67,89 33,93 
400 000 452,48 181 90,52 45,24 
500 000 565,60 226,25 113,15 56,55 
600 000 678,72 271,5 135,78 67,86 
700 000 791,84 316,75 158,41 79,17 
800 000 904,96 362 181,04 90,48 
900 000 1018,08 407,25 203,67 101,79 
1 000 000 1131,20 452,5 226,3 113,1 
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time required to carry out DoS tests dosT   is determined 
as follows (7). 
 
inviteudpdos TTT +=     (7) 
 
Results and success rate of DoS tests carried out are 
included in the report for the tester. 
 
Fig. 7. Impact of change in bandwidth on CPU load in 
case of udpflood attack. 
 
 
2.3   Registration and Manipulation Module  
Once the potential perpetrator obtains information about 
existing accounts, he can manipulate these accounts 
quite easily. The SPT system we developed can also test 
SIP servers’ security, i.e. measures against manipulating 
the registration, see Fig. 8. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. SPT System - RM Module. 
 
To carry out this test, the system uses reghijacker which 
substitutes the legitimate account registration with a 
fake, non-existing one. This type of attack can easily be 
expanded to a so called MITM, Man-in-the-Middle. In 
this attack, a non-existent user is substituted by a valid 
SIP registration and all incoming signaling and media to 
the legitimate registration will be re-directed to the 
newly created registration. In this case, the tester needs 
to define the value of the SIP account which is to be 
stolen in the system and where authentication of 
REGISTER request is allowed, also a password to this 
account. Where the tester fails to define these values, the 
system automatically assigns an account and its 
password from the list created while scanning and 
monitoring the central. Time required to carry out the 
test   is insignificant compared to operational times of 
other modules.  
 
2.4  Spam over Internet Telephony Module 
Today, one of the most popular attacks on the Internet is 
spam. It is estimated that Spams account for 80 - 90% of 
total attacks on the Internet. Security experts predict that 
Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) will be a major 
threat in the future. The level of annoyance is even 
greater than with classical spam. Out team in CESNET 
had developed SPITFILE [12] which served as a testing 
tool while developing security against such type of 
attacks. The SPT system uses the core of this 
application, together with Sipp with pre-set call schemes 
in the XML format [10], to simulate a SPIT attack on the 
target SIP server (Fig. 9). 
In the form, the tester defines the values of a valid SIP 
internal, national and international  accounts – the called 
parties to which the SPIT call will be directed and then 
the value and password to a valid SIP account – the 
caller through which the call will be initiated. Where the 
tester fails to define these values, the system 
automatically assigns an account and an appropriate 
password from the list created while scanning and 
monitoring the central. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. SPT System - SPIT Module. 
 
To be able to process parameters entered into Sipp and 
XML dynamically, we applied two methods. Using the 
first one, a correct parameter is assigned to the values 
entered into the forms by the tester, and it is then sent to 
Sipp. In order to dynamically switch the telephone 
numbers based on the inserted numbers in the forms, 
values in the XML scheme for Sipp need to change 
dynamically too. This is the purpose of the .csv file 
which is generated by the application directly after the 
tester inserts numbers in the form. This is where the 
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XML scheme gets the telephone numbers and Sipp 
creates the SIP message for the softswitch. 
Created scheme serves as instructions according to how 
Sipp generates the calls. Fig. 10 shows an INVITE 
request in XML scheme for Sipp. 
 
 <send retrans="500"> 
<![CDATA[ 
 
INVITE sip:2717@[remote_ip] SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/[transport][local_ip]:[l
ocal_port];branch=[branch] 
From: [service]<sip:[service]@[remote
_ip]>;tag=[call_number] 
To: 2717 <sip:2717@[remote_ip]> 
Call-ID: d///[call_id] 
CSeq: 3 INVITE 
User-Agent: Grandstream GXP2000 
1.1.6.37 
Contact: <sip:[service]@[local_ip]:[l
ocal_port];transport=[transport]> 
Max-Forwards: 70 
Allow: INVITE,ACK,CANCEL,BYE,NOTIFY,R
EFER,OPTIONS,INFO,SUBSCRIBE,UPDATE,PR
ACK,MESSAGE 
Supported: replaces, timer, path 
Subject: Performance Test 
Content-Type: application/sdp 
Content-Length: [len] 
 
v=0 
o=[service] 8000 8001 IN 
IP[local_ip_type] [local_ip] 
s=SIP Call 
c=IN IP[media_ip_type] [media_ip] 
t=0 0 
m=audio [auto_media_port] RTP/AVP 0 
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 
a=ptime:20 
a=sendrecv 
 
]]>     
</send> 
 
 
Fig. 10. INVITE Request in Sipp XML Scheme. 
 
 
INVITE message initiates a call to the SIP server but 
before Sipp sends the registers on dedicated account on 
SIP server, over which the calls will be initiated. Fig. 11 
shows code in a XML scheme, that is used for sending 
prerecorded voice message in .pcap format. This 
message is sent by a Sipp as RTP flow to the called 
party.   
<nop> 
<action> 
<exec 
play_pcap_audio="/home/filip/Plocha/S
PITFILE/pcap_examples/g711u.pcap"/> 
</action> 
</nop> 
 
<pause milliseconds="9000"/> 
 
Fig. 11. Sending .pcap Message over Sipp. 
 
If the test was successful, a SIP call is initiated from the 
caller’s account, and the end device with the registered 
account of the called party starts ringing. Once the call 
is answered, a pre-recorded message is played and the 
call terminated. Time required to carry out the test  spitT  
is determined by the length of the pre-recorded 
message. The final report on penetration tests which the 
tester receives via e-mail, will, besides information on 
all previous tests, also contain an analysis and success 
rate of the SPIT module’s test. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Division of the SPT system into individual 
modules. 
 
Fig. 12 illustrates the division of the SPT system into 
individual modules and shows time intervals necessary 
to carry out individual tests in respective modules. Time 
requirements of the whole SPT system can be expressed 
by equation (8). Its value depends on many factors and 
can radically change in accordance with the type of tests 
requested by the tester. Its value is for reference only. 
 
spitrmdossmspt TTTTT +++=    (8) 
 
3   Results 
Although the SPT system is still in the phase of intensive 
testing and development, basic operational tests of all 
available modules were carried out (Fig. 13). Each test is 
accompanied by a short description of countermeasure’s 
principles and methods [12] which should limit or 
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completely mitigate potential security gaps that were 
revealed during SIP servers’ testing.  
 
 
 
Fig. 13. SPT System – Results. 
 
Before the final report is sent to the tester’s e-mail, the 
our system is going to check up the completness and 
correctness. The  variable $CRow[0]==1  represents the 
successful validation while $CRow[0]==-1 is returned 
in fault. The final report contains the gained results and 
security recommendations. A method $mail->Send() is 
applied for sending and the appropriate record si created 
in database to avoid resending. The part of script is 
depicted on Fig. 14. 
 
$Result = mysql_query("SELECT id,rid F
ROM t_test WHERE type='0' AND 
value='0'"); 
for($r=0;$r<mysql_num_rows($Result);$r
++) 
 { 
  $Row = mysql_fetch_row($Result); 
  $RResult = 
mysql_query("SELECT data FROM t_raw 
WHERE id='".$Row[1]."'"); 
  $RRow = mysql_fetch_row($RResult); 
  $Data = unserialize($RRow[0]); 
$CResult = mysql_query("SELECT value F
ROM t_test WHERE rid='".$Row[1]."' AND 
type>=1 AND type<=5 ORDER BY type"); 
  $Ok = true; 
  
for($i=0;$i<mysql_num_rows($CResult);$
i++) 
   { 
    $CRow = mysql_fetch_row($CResult); 
    if(!($CRow[0]==-1 || $CRow[0]==1)) 
    { 
     $Ok = false; 
    } 
   } 
  if($Ok) 
   { 
    mysql_query("UPDATE t_test SET 
start=NOW(),value=10 WHERE 
id='".$Row[0]."'"); 
 
$From = 'info@pen.cesnet.org'; 
$To = $Data['Main']['Email']; 
$Subject = 'Results of test pen.cesnet
.org'; 
$Body = ""; 
$CResult2 = mysql_query("SELECT type,v
alue,result FROM t_test WHERE 
rid='".$Row[1]."' AND type>=1 AND 
type<=5 ORDER BY type"); 
     
for($i=0;$i<mysql_num_rows($CResult2);
$i++) 
      { 
       $CRow = 
mysql_fetch_row($CResult2); 
       switch($CRow[0]) 
        { 
         case 1: 
          $Body .= "Result of Main 
test\n"; 
          $Body .= "===========\n"; 
          break; 
 
         case 2: 
          $Body .= "Result of Scanning 
and Monitoring test\n"; 
          $Body .= "===========\n"; 
          break; 
 
         
 
 case 3: 
          $Body .= "Result of Denial 
of Service test\n"; 
          $Body .= "============\n"; 
          break; 
 
         case 4: 
          $Body .= "Result of 
Registration Manipulation test\n"; 
          $Body .= "=============\n"; 
          break; 
 
         case 5: 
          $Body .= "Result of SPIT 
test\n"; 
          $Body .= "=============\n"; 
          break; 
        } 
       $Body .= $CRow[2]; 
       $Body .= "\n\n"; 
      } 
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    $mail = new PHPMailer(); 
    $mail->IsSMTP();   
    $mail->CharSet  = "utf-8"; 
    $mail->Host = "smtp.cesnet.cz"; 
    $mail->From = $From; 
    $mail->FromName = 
'info@pen.cesnet.org'; 
    $mail->AddAddress($To); 
    $mail->Subject = $Subject; 
    $mail->Body  = $Body; 
    if(!$mail->Send()) 
 
Fig. 14.  Validation and final report sending. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. SIP Penetration Tests System Testbed. 
 
     Fig. 15 describes the basic testing topology. The 
system  is denoted as SPT and Asterisk as VoIP PBX. 
Asterisk was installed at Dell PowerEdge R510 server. 
 
 
3.1 Scanning and Monitoring 
The first step was to record SIP server’s IP address and 
the e-mail address to send the final report to. Next, the 
S&M module and subsequently Nmap and SIPVicious 
applications were launched. Values for Nmap were set 
by default, value of nrE for SIPVicious was set to range 
between 1000-9999. The device found all three 
registered accounts  validE  7001-7003 and listed open 
TCP and UDP ports at Asterisk. Once   nrP  was set to 
7001-7003 and a text file  drP  containing test and 
7003ab string, the test to obtain passwords to individual 
accounts was also successful. Total time incurred on 
testing module   ≅smT 235s. If we had to protect and 
prevent SIP server from scanning and monitoring, then 
an implementation of firewall is the effective solution or 
an intrusion detection system that is able to distinguish 
scanning and monitoring. The next effective solution is 
to divide the network logical infrastructure into VLANs 
and decompose the provided services into more physical 
servers (TFTP, HTTP servers). The prevention of 
accounts and passwords detection is difficult, moreover, 
the tools for detection apply the standard SIP methods 
and is not trivial to distinguish legitimate behavior from 
an attack. In this case, there is recommended to divide 
the infrastructure into individual VLANs so that the 
detection for intruder was as difficult as possible. 
 
3.2  Denial of Service 
Using udpflood, the tester sent 500000 UDP packets 
directly to port 5060. Bandwidth was set to 100Mbps, 
Asterisk processed 90% calls. Once the test was 
completed, Asterisk recovered to a full operation mode. 
To be able to compare, we substituted Asterisk by 
OpenSIPS in this test. Call processing under the same 
attack was entirely error-free. When testing using 
inviteflood on the valid account 7001, we found out that 
this attack is much more destructive in terms of 
computational power. As early as at 100000 INVITE 
request when  inviteT ≅    9s, CPU load for both Asterisk 
and OpenSIPS reached 100% and failed to process a 
single incoming or outgoing call. Once the test was 
completed, both centrals recovered to a full operation 
mode. The possibilities, how to protect from Flood DoS 
attacks, are the following:  to divide the network 
infrastructure into separate VLANs,  to have in use 
solely TLS, to implement L2 network elements with 
DoS detection or to apply SIP firewall that can detect 
DoS attacks and minimalize their impact. 
 
3.3  Registration Manipulation 
When testing possibility for registration manipulation, 
we entered values of account 7003 and its password 
7003ab manually into the system. Once the test was 
completed, we established whether the attack was 
successful. The aim of the attack was to de-register 
account 7003 and to direct all incoming calls to a fake 
account which does not exist. Thus, calls were 
terminated as unconnected. The call to 7003 was not put    
through. The TCP protocol is recommended at transport 
level to prevent a registration hijacking because the 
manipulation with TCP requires higher complexity.  
Next option, how to minimalize this threat, is to use  
REGISTER message authentication.  We could decrease 
the registration interval, as well, it is quite simple but 
effective. 
 
3.4  Spam over Internet Telephony 
As stated above, we used SPITFILE application, 
developed by this paper’s authors, to test the central’s 
vulnerability to SPIT attacks. The tester entered 
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manually into the system the value of a valid account 
7002 on which a SPIT attack was to be initiated, as well 
as the value of a valid account 7003 and password to it 
(7003ab) which was supposed to initiate the SPIT call. 
Once the test was launched, SPITFILE registered on the 
participant 7003 and then started to generate a call to 
account 7002. The end device registered on 7002 began 
ringing, and once the call was answered, a recording 
with an advertisement was played. A few methods exist 
how to restrict the SPIT propagation, which are more or 
less efficient, but their combination bring quit strong 
protection against the type of attack. Among these 
methods the utilization of the various automatically or 
manually editable lists belong, on their base the call is 
permitted or prohibited, eventually an interaction with 
voice menu can be the effective protection against call 
bots. Authors developed own solution ANTISPIT [12] 
that exploits the specific human behaviour and 
automatically modifies the Blacklist table without 
participation of called party, the approach is based on the 
statistical Blacklist. 
 
 
4   Conclusion 
The aim of the authors was to develop a tool to carry out 
penetration tests on SIP servers. The system that was 
designed and implemented consists of several modules 
that are able to generate selected types of attacks which 
the authors deem most popular. The system then 
analyses to what extent is the target component secured, 
drafts assessments containing tests’ results and proposes 
factual recommendations to ensure security against the 
threat concerned. The assessment report is sent as a text 
document to an e-mail. The system is currently under 
intensive testing. It is planned that in the future, it will be 
extended to include other testing modules and functions 
such as for instance testing of the whole VoIP 
infrastructure and heavy testing of individual 
components. 
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